Make a change to free the ion memory allocated for keymaster client
even if keymaster app doesn't need to be unloaded from TZ, so as to
avoid memory leak.
CRs-Fixed: 724638
Change-Id: I3ddb68c8a3f96b0a44afc3efc63e93f0a8be51bb
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
We've made changes on app session managements to save app name in
qseecom when loading app by userspace client. This change is to save
app name when loading app by kernel client, then qseecom can compare
the app name correctly when sending commands to TZ.
CRs-Fixed: 748491
Change-Id: I341a1a89f0e8a45056be7a5ce0a6a540842bc5dd
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
keymaster app has two names with different length: "keymaster" and
"keymaste". To compare the app names correctly, the shorter name
length is choosen for memcmp in __qseecom_send_cmd.
Change-Id: I5f0dff7f9756362be40cc64985b65bc2268d734f
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: William Clark <wclark@codeaurora.org>
Make a change in qseecom_unload_app to stop the execution of app
searching when an app is founded, even if this app is in use with
ref_cnt greater than one.
Change-Id: I0328252668ef1069ec514bfb913b927a7da76594
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: William Clark <wclark@codeaurora.org>
Media server is associated with multiple apps on TZ-side.
Unloading a single app for clean up is not enought. QSEECOM
needs to handle the app load & unload of multiple apps
associated with the client. During app_load & app_unload
along with app_id, app_name should also be checked. Besides,
keymaster will not be unloaded.
Change-Id: Iea53362a21e359e54e40a0a93688a05264cfde5c
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Dhalinarasimha <hnamgund@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
In some scenarios when qseecom_release is called with the incorrect
client handle type. Hence proper cleanup is not done for the memory
allocated to the device handle or to unload the app.
This change addresses the cleanup issues related to qseecom client in
qseecom_release call by ensuring the handle type is set correctly and
cleanup is done properly based on client type.
Change-Id: I126aa431ce635ae98100b774e3d92b704635d199
Signed-off-by: AnilKumar Chimata <anilc@codeaurora.org>
A process waiting on a signal can be awaken by any signals. We
need to only continue processing when the condition of the
wait event is met.
Change-Id: Ib2102babbb505876f89b04399729e6ff5a475605
Signed-off-by: Mona Hossain <mhossain@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
Upon receiving qseecom_release() app corresponding to the app id
needs to be shutdown.This is applicable to user space clients as well.
Change-Id: Ie659a9409f8470b7ed4a5088e6779b50c5dc1cca
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Dhalinarasimha <hnamgund@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
Accessing the css_set object should be protected with css_set_lock.
NULL check is required before accesing object.
CRs-fixed: 723762
Change-Id: Ia3a0314a04419889d5002a8f2bf2c1fe9dfa3671
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
The vpe parameters process pp_frame and event_cmd are
freed in failure case to avoid memleak.
Change-Id: I5391f7053ae1e801f4ac40cece9786ea0c9c076d
Signed-off-by: Shilpa Mamidi <shilpam@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Vijaya Kumar T M <vtmuni@codeaurora.org>
Freed pointers in error case and also added
check condition before going to use any parameters.
Change-Id: I1c2fa6d8712b95673b30fe0fab517b54da736792
Signed-off-by: Shilpa Mamidi <shilpam@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Vijaya Kumar T M <vtmuni@codeaurora.org>
Currently codec driver uses request_firmware to get
calibration data but as this firmware file is also written by
userspace process after bootup, it is not recommended to
use request_firmware. ALSA core provides mechanism to get
hardware dependant data using hwdep nodes. Sitar/tabla codec will
use aforementioned nodes to get calibration data from userspace.
Cherry-pick of Ifb4c36632b890b61a0bc67d8af44a5a10233d7bd
Change-Id: Icd7424ba99b3546d6078262790c9f8d5a30e4335
Signed-off-by: Shreyas Nagasandra Chandrasekhar <snagas@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Divya Narayanan Poojary <dnaray@codeaurora.org>
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
include/net/ip.h
net/ipv4/route.c
Change-Id: I53e4b500a4db2f5fece937a42a3bd810b2640c44
Delay PIL operation until all data structures used by WCNSS SMD
interrupt handler are initialized. There could be a race condition
where the SMD interrupt handler is called even before the WCNSS
trigger function is completed.
Change-Id: I1e411ca515eaa53e96875df62d9f654d4b32999c
CRs-Fixed: 496402
Signed-off-by: Anand N Sunkad <asunka@codeaurora.org>
Change warning message to debug message to reduce the excessive logging.
These changes are applicable only if any process is trying to interrupt
the blocking listener services.
Change-Id: Ie1c9af0daf16ef2c39e198f30b0151e2246d79e3
Signed-off-by: AnilKumar Chimata <anilc@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Dhalinarasimha <hnamgund@codeaurora.org>
commit 5188cd44c55db3e92cd9e77a40b5baa7ed4340f7 upstream.
UFO is now disabled on all drivers that work with virtio net headers,
but userland may try to send UFO/IPv6 packets anyway. Instead of
sending with ID=0, we should select identifiers on their behalf (as we
used to).
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: 916e4cf46d02 ("ipv6: reuse ip6_frag_id from ip6_ufo_append_data")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: For 3.2, net/ipv6/output_core.c is a completely new file]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit c3b4ccb8b03769e2867fabecc078483ee6710ccf upstream.
With commits 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count") and
04ca6973f7c1 ("ip: make IP identifiers less predictable"), IP
identifiers are generated from a counter chosen from an array of
counters indexed by the hash of the outgoing packet header's source
address, destination address, and protocol number. Thus, in
__ip_make_skb(), we must now call ip_select_ident() only after setting
these fields in the IP header to prevent IP identifiers from being
generated from bogus counters.
IP id sequence before fix: 18174, 5789, 5953, 59420, 59637, ...
After fix: 5967, 6185, 6374, 6600, 6795, 6892, 7051, 7288, ...
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[Backported to 3.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 7e46dddd6f6cd5dbf3c7bd04a7e75d19475ac9f2 upstream.
Commit d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far
jumps") introduced a bug that caused the fix to be incomplete. Due to
incorrect evaluation, far jump to segment with L bit cleared (i.e., 32-bit
segment) and RIP with any of the high bits set (i.e, RIP[63:32] != 0) set may
not trigger #GP. As we know, this imposes a security problem.
In addition, the condition for two warnings was incorrect.
Fixes: d1442d85cc30ea75f7d399474ca738e0bc96f715
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
[Add #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 to avoid complaints of undefined behavior. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 3669ef9fa7d35f573ec9c0e0341b29251c2734a7 upstream.
The Witcher 2 did something like this to allocate a TLS segment index:
struct user_desc u_info;
bzero(&u_info, sizeof(u_info));
u_info.entry_number = (uint32_t)-1;
syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &u_info);
Strictly speaking, this code was never correct. It should have set
read_exec_only and seg_not_present to 1 to indicate that it wanted
to find a free slot without putting anything there, or it should
have put something sensible in the TLS slot if it wanted to allocate
a TLS entry for real. The actual effect of this code was to
allocate a bogus segment that could be used to exploit espfix.
The set_thread_area hardening patches changed the behavior, causing
set_thread_area to return -EINVAL and crashing the game.
This changes set_thread_area to interpret this as a request to find
a free slot and to leave it empty, which isn't *quite* what the game
expects but should be close enough to keep it working. In
particular, using the code above to allocate two segments will
allocate the same segment both times.
According to FrostbittenKing on Github, this fixes The Witcher 2.
If this somehow still causes problems, we could instead allocate
a limit==0 32-bit data segment, but that seems rather ugly to me.
Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0cb251abe1ff0958b8e468a9a9a905b80ae3a746.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit e30ab185c490e9a9381385529e0fd32f0a399495 upstream.
32-bit programs don't have an lm bit in their ABI, so they can't
reliably cause LDT_empty to return true without resorting to memset.
They shouldn't need to do this.
This should fix a longstanding, if minor, issue in all 64-bit kernels
as well as a potential regression in the TLS hardening code.
Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/72a059de55e86ad5e2935c80aa91880ddf19d07c.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 41bdc78544b8a93a9c6814b8bbbfef966272abbe upstream.
Installing a 16-bit RW data segment into the GDT defeats espfix.
AFAICT this will not affect glibc, Wine, or dosemu at all.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: security@kernel.org <security@kernel.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 29fa6825463c97e5157284db80107d1bfac5d77b upstream.
paravirt_enabled has the following effects:
- Disables the F00F bug workaround warning. There is no F00F bug
workaround any more because Linux's standard IDT handling already
works around the F00F bug, but the warning still exists. This
is only cosmetic, and, in any event, there is no such thing as
KVM on a CPU with the F00F bug.
- Disables 32-bit APM BIOS detection. On a KVM paravirt system,
there should be no APM BIOS anyway.
- Disables tboot. I think that the tboot code should check the
CPUID hypervisor bit directly if it matters.
- paravirt_enabled disables espfix32. espfix32 should *not* be
disabled under KVM paravirt.
The last point is the purpose of this patch. It fixes a leak of the
high 16 bits of the kernel stack address on 32-bit KVM paravirt
guests. Fixes CVE-2014-8134.
Suggested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit f55fefd1a5a339b1bd08c120b93312d6eb64a9fb upstream.
The WARN_ON checking whether i_mutex is held in
pagecache_isize_extended() was wrong because some filesystems (e.g.
XFS) use different locks for serialization of truncates / writes. So
just remove the check.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit eaca2d8e75e90a70a63a6695c9f61932609db212 upstream.
Found by the UC-KLEE tool: A user could supply less input to
firewire-cdev ioctls than write- or write/read-type ioctl handlers
expect. The handlers used data from uninitialized kernel stack then.
This could partially leak back to the user if the kernel subsequently
generated fw_cdev_event_'s (to be read from the firewire-cdev fd)
which notably would contain the _u64 closure field which many of the
ioctl argument structures contain.
The fact that the handlers would act on random garbage input is a
lesser issue since all handlers must check their input anyway.
The fix simply always null-initializes the entire ioctl argument buffer
regardless of the actual length of expected user input. That is, a
runtime overhead of memset(..., 40) is added to each firewirew-cdev
ioctl() call. [Comment from Clemens Ladisch: This part of the stack is
most likely to be already in the cache.]
Remarks:
- There was never any leak from kernel stack to the ioctl output
buffer itself. IOW, it was not possible to read kernel stack by a
read-type or write/read-type ioctl alone; the leak could at most
happen in combination with read()ing subsequent event data.
- The actual expected minimum user input of each ioctl from
include/uapi/linux/firewire-cdev.h is, in bytes:
[0x00] = 32, [0x05] = 4, [0x0a] = 16, [0x0f] = 20, [0x14] = 16,
[0x01] = 36, [0x06] = 20, [0x0b] = 4, [0x10] = 20, [0x15] = 20,
[0x02] = 20, [0x07] = 4, [0x0c] = 0, [0x11] = 0, [0x16] = 8,
[0x03] = 4, [0x08] = 24, [0x0d] = 20, [0x12] = 36, [0x17] = 12,
[0x04] = 20, [0x09] = 24, [0x0e] = 4, [0x13] = 40, [0x18] = 4.
Reported-by: David Ramos <daramos@stanford.edu>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 7ddc6a2199f1da405a2fb68c40db8899b1a8cd87 upstream.
These functions can be executed on the int3 stack, so kprobes
are dangerous. Tracing is probably a bad idea, too.
Fixes: b645af2d5905 ("x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/50e33d26adca60816f3ba968875801652507d0c4.1416870125.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Use __kprobes instead of NOKPROBE_SYMBOL()
- Don't use __visible]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit b645af2d5905c4e32399005b867987919cbfc3ae upstream.
It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail. This can happen because
of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.
Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace. To make this work, there's
an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.
This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception. It's also
buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
begin with. For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.
This patch throws out bad_iret entirely. As a replacement, it augments
the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
in C. It's should be clearer and more correct.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- We didn't use the _ASM_EXTABLE macro
- Don't use __visible]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit af726f21ed8af2cdaa4e93098dc211521218ae65 upstream.
There's nothing special enough about the espfix64 double fault fixup to
justify writing it in assembly. Move it to C.
This also fixes a bug: if the double fault came from an IST stack, the
old asm code would return to a partially uninitialized stack frame.
Fixes: 3891a04aafd668686239349ea58f3314ea2af86b
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Keep using the paranoiderrorentry macro to generate the asm code
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 6f442be2fb22be02cafa606f1769fa1e6f894441 upstream.
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- No need to define trace_stack_segment
- Use the errorentry macro to generate #SS asm code
- Adjust context
- Checked that this matches Luis's backport for Ubuntu]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit bbaf113a481b6ce32444c125807ad3618643ce57 upstream.
Fix incorrect cast that always results in wrong address for the new
frame on 64-bit kernels.
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nsn.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8110/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 746c9e9f92dde2789908e51a354ba90a1962a2eb upstream.
We have a historical hack that treats missing ranges properties as the
equivalent of an empty one. This is needed for ancient PowerMac "bad"
device-trees, and shouldn't be enabled for any other PowerPC platform,
otherwise we get some nasty layout of devices in sysfs or even
duplication when a set of otherwise identically named devices is
created multiple times under a different parent node with no ranges
property.
This fix is needed for the PowerNV i2c busses to be exposed properly
and will fix a number of other embedded cases.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit efbd50d2f62fc1f69a3dcd153e63ba28cc8eb27f upstream.
It seems struct esd_usb2 dev is not deallocated on disconnect. The patch adds
the missing deallocation.
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: Matthias Fuchs <matthias.fuchs@esd.eu>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 2cd3949f702692cf4c5d05b463f19cd706a92dd3 upstream.
We have some very similarly named command-line options:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsave", x86_xsave_setup);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsaveopt", x86_xsaveopt_setup);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsaves", x86_xsaves_setup);
__setup() is designed to match options that take arguments, like
"foo=bar" where you would have:
__setup("foo", x86_foo_func...);
The problem is that "noxsave" actually _matches_ "noxsaves" in
the same way that "foo" matches "foo=bar". If you boot an old
kernel that does not know about "noxsaves" with "noxsaves" on the
command line, it will interpret the argument as "noxsave", which
is not what you want at all.
This makes the "noxsave" handler only return success when it finds
an *exact* match.
[ tglx: We really need to make __setup() more robust. ]
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141111220133.FE053984@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit c251ea7bd7a04f1f2575467e0de76e803cf59149 upstream.
On a mx28evk with a sgtl5000 codec we notice a loud 'click' sound to happen
5 seconds after the end of a playback.
The SMALL_POP bit should fix this, but its definition is incorrect:
according to the sgtl5000 manual it is bit 0 of CHIP_REF_CTRL register, not
bit 1.
Fix the definition accordingly and enable the bit as intended per the code
comment.
After applying this change, no loud 'click' sound is heard after playback
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit cfd9167af14eb4ec21517a32911d460083ee3d59 upstream.
RT2800 and newer hardware require padding between header and payload if
header length is not multiple of 4.
For historical reasons we also align payload to to 4 bytes boundary, but
such alignment is not needed on modern H/W.
Patch fixes skb_under_panic problems reported from time to time:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=84911https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=72471http://marc.info/?l=linux-wireless&m=139108549530402&w=2https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1087591
Panic happened because we eat 4 bytes of skb headroom on each
(re)transmission when sending frame without the payload and the header
length not being multiple of 4 (i.e. QoS header has 26 bytes). On such
case because paylad_aling=2 is bigger than header_align=0 we increase
header_align by 4 bytes. To prevent that we could change the check to:
if (payload_length && payload_align > header_align)
header_align += 4;
but not aligning payload at all is more effective and alignment is not
really needed by H/W (that has been tested on OpenWrt project for few
years now).
Reported-and-tested-by: Antti S. Lankila <alankila@bel.fi>
Debugged-by: Antti S. Lankila <alankila@bel.fi>
Reported-by: Henrik Asp <solenskiner@gmail.com>
Originally-From: Helmut Schaa <helmut.schaa@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit c1b9b9b1ad2df6144ca3fbe6989f7bd9ea5c5562 upstream.
FSI doesn't support PAUSE.
Remove SNDRV_PCM_INFO_PAUSE flags from snd_pcm_hardware info
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Spegelius